3. The main objective of the part relating to the separation provisions (Articles 40-125) is to ensure legal certainty so that, at the end of the transition period, edough proceedings can be closed on the basis of the application of EU law, in accordance with EU law. This third part also contains the special provisions necessary for the eu`s orderly exit from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The citizens` rights provisions were agreed by the UK and the EU in the draft withdrawal agreement in March 2018. There are no substantial changes or additions, except in the rights provisions of nationals of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. There are also provisions on other “separation issues” to clarify what applies to ongoing police cooperation, goods on the market and many other things. The 2019 revisions also adapted elements of the political declaration and replaced the word “appropriate” with “appropriate” with respect to labour standards. According to Sam Lowe, a trade fellow at the Centre for European Reform, the amendment excludes labour standards from dispute resolution mechanisms.  In addition, the Equal Competition Mechanism has been postponed from the legally binding withdrawal agreement to the political declaration, and the line of the political statement that “the United Kingdom will consider taking into account alignment with trade union rules in the relevant areas” has been removed.  The agreement was revised as part of the Johnson Department renegotiation in 2019. The amendments fit about 5% of the text In addition, the withdrawal agreement governs the UK`s contributions to the EU budget. The agreement implies that the UK, as a member, will pay the entire long-term budget until the end of 2020. During the transitional period, the UK and the EU-27 will seek to conclude the agreement that will strengthen their trade relations after the end of the transition period.
On the basis of the revised political declaration, the EU and the United Kingdom appear to be aiming for a comprehensive but “classic” free trade agreement for goods, services and investment. The political statement is thin in detail, but trade in goods will be based on a free trade agreement that will at least guarantee that there will be no tariffs or quotas, as well as some degree of regulatory alignment with the EU. However, as a result of the free trade agreement, customs controls are required, requiring each party to prove that the goods originate from their respective customs territory, in order to obtain duty-free treatment. This means that the UK and the EU-27 must now agree on detailed rules of origin. This is probably a complex and tedious process. At least companies need to think about the rules of origin they want for different products and start putting pressure on them as soon as the UK and eu start negotiating the new free trade agreement. It is encouraging to note that the scope of the future trade regime appears to encompass services, including financial services and investment (although the agreement is in turn very detailed) and that it provides assurance that the agreement on future relations will offer a liberalisation of trade in services well beyond the obligations of the United Kingdom and the WTO. Part 6 relates to the institutional provisions underlying the agreement and how to resolve VA disputes.
The main changes to Part 6 of the March 2018 draft relate to disputes related to the agreement itself, which the Commission had originally proposed, should be resolved by the ECJ if they could not be resolved in the Joint Committee. Instead, the November draft proposes, in Article 170, that all disputes that are not settled in the Joint Committee be referred to an independent arbitration tribunal which will give a binding decision on the dispute.